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6.1  Introduction 
Corporate income tax revenues have declined steadily as a fraction of 
U.S. GNP  over the past three decades, from 5.3%  in 1953 to 4.1%, 3.3%, 
and 1.8% in 1963, 1973, and 1983, respectively (Economic Report of the 
President 1984, tables B1, B76). Indeed, this decline is even more striking 
if one subtracts from corporate revenues the remittances by the Federal 
Reserve System of their seignorage. In fiscal 1983, corporation income tax 
receipts net of these payments were only $37.0 billion (Economic Report 
of the President 1984, table B72), or just over 6% of federal revenues. 
This trend might appear to have clear implications both for the distri- 
bution of after-tax income in the United States and for the incentives that 
corporations have to invest in plant and equipment. But such aggregate 
tax measures can be very misleading because they are, at the same time, 
too comprehensive and yet incomplete. They do not relay the different in- 
centives and burdens imposed on different investors and different assets, 
nor do  they account for other taxes which, in combination with the corpo- 
rate tax, determine the tax burden on owners of corporate capital and the 
incentives that such individuals have to invest via the corporation. 
In this paper, I discuss four related issues that must be considered be- 
fore the economic effects of the corporate tax can be understood.  These 
are the additional taxes on corporate source income levied on dividends, 
capital gains, and interest payments; the presence in the tax code of invest- 
ment incentives such as accelerated depreciation; the corporate tax treat- 
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ment of risky income; and the determinants and implications of corporate 
borrowing. I conclude with a review of this discussion. 
6.2  Shareholders’ Taxes and “Double” Taxation 
Many who favor a reduction in taxes paid by corporations see such a re- 
duction as an offset to the “double” taxation occurring when corporate 
profits are taxed  at the corporate level and then, if  distributed, at the 
shareholder level. Compared to investment income from an unincorpo- 
rated business, there is, indeed, a second layer of taxation. Even for earn- 
ings that are retained, associated increases in the corporation’s value may 
eventually be subject to individual capital gains taxes. 
Traditional economic analysis (e.g., Harberger 1962) suggests that such 
a pattern of taxation discourages corporate investment and, by doing so, 
causes part of the extra tax burden to be shifted from corporate share- 
holders to others in the economy: other investors, who find their returns 
diminished by the flood of capital from the corporate sector; purchasers 
of  corporate commodities,  who must pay higher  prices for goods that 
have become more expensive to produce; and, potentially, wage earners, 
if the demand for labor is less intensive in the expending areas outside the 
corporate sector than within it. 
Associated also with this hypothesized shift in resources is an economic 
distortion, in that investors are being encouraged by the tax system to forgo 
relatively more profitable corporate sector projects to avoid the extra tax- 
ation. 
But the taxation of dividends does not necessarily lead to this type of 
outcome. The question is best put in the following way: does the taxation 
of dividends mean that corporations must earn a higher rate of return, be- 
fore tax, to satisfy their shareholders’ required after-tax return? The an- 
swer may very well be that they need not do so. Consider an investment fi- 
nanced by the method most commonly used to raise equity capital, the 
retention of  earnings. Suppose the potential project will earn 10% a year 
after corporate taxes, all of which will be distributed as dividends. These 
dividends will then be subject to additional taxes, unless the shareholders 
are exempt from taxation. But this does not mean a lower rate of return 
than 10% for individual investors. Consider the initial investment these 
investors made when the firm retained its earnings. The cost to investors 
was the forgone dividends, less the taxes that would have been due on such 
dividends. For the sake of concreteness, suppose the typical  investor’s 
marginal tax rate is 40%. Then, per dollar of retained earnings, the inves- 
tor had to give up 60 cents out of pocket to  get this stream of 10% returns, 
which will also be taxed at 40%  to yield a net return of 6% per gross in- 
vested dollar but 10% of forgone, after-tax dollars. 109  Economic Effects of the Corporate Income Tax 
Lest this result be dismissed as anomalous, the reader should note its 
equivalence to the treatment accorded individual  savings under  a con- 
sumption tax, which is recognized to  leave the return to savings effectively 
untaxed. Under a consumption tax scheme, savers would receive a reduc- 
tion in their tax base for amounts saved through the corporation and add 
to the tax base amounts received and not saved. 
This argument suggests that while taxes on dividends may be paid, they 
need  not  constitute  a disincentive to save via the corporation. In this 
sense, there is no double taxation: only the corporate income tax lowers 
the saver’s rate of return. As with a consumption tax, taxes on dividends 
currently received represent the payment, with interest, of a tax liability 
deferred by the previous retention of earnings. 
A corollary of this view is that corporations face a higher marginal tax 
burden when they must raise equity capital through the issuance of new 
shares, because there is no initial reduction in stockholders’ taxes when 
the shares are issued. 
Empirical evidence offers some support for this position.  In an earlier 
paper (Auerbach 1984), I attempted to measure how the rates of return re- 
quired by corporations on their investments differed according to a num- 
ber of factors, including how these investments were financed. Using data 
from the period 1963-77  for 274 major American corporations (most listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange, the remainder on the American Ex- 
change),  I  first corrected income statement information to give a truer 
measure of annual earnings, and then estimated equations to determine 
the effects of a number of firm characteristics on future earnings. One sig- 
nificant finding was that, for given levels of investment, firms issuing new 
shares in a particular year experienced higher increases in earnings in sub- 
sequent years than those that invested solely through retentions and debt 
issues. The results suggested that this sample of firms required, on aver- 
age,  about 4.8%  more,  after tax, when financing investments through 
new issues. Additional evidence suggested that this phenomenon is associ- 
ated with individual taxation, rather than other potential reasons for an 
aversion to new issues. 
This finding has several interesting implications. First, corporate stock 
normally will trade at a discount relative to the intrinsic value of the firm’s 
assets. This is due, not to  any irrationality on the part of investors, but to 
the fact that firms have the incentive to retain earnings as long as the 
market value of new projects undertaken is at least equal to their net cost 
to investors. Hence, a retentions-financed project costing $1 million has 
a net cost of $600,000 to investors in the 40% tax bracket. The manage- 
ment of the firm  will  increase  its  shareholders’  assets  by  undertaking 
the project as long as the firm’s value increases by at least $600,000 not 
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Second, this discount means that there is an incentive for corporations 
to invest in corporate stock, either their own, through repurchases, or that 
of others, through acquisitions.  This provides a direct way of obtaining 
assets at a price below their intrinsic worth. The puzzle is why firms do  not 
engage in more of this kind of activity. 
Third, a general reduction in the taxation of dividend income would 
have very different consequences than reduced corporate taxation. Since 
the dividend tax does not influence the marginal tax rate for investment fi- 
nanced through retention,  its reduction will not affect these investment 
decisions, despite the decline in corporate revenue. 
6.3  The Impact of Investment  Incentives 
One reason for the decline in corporate tax collections since 1953 has 
been a decline in corporaate profitability. Another has been the reduction 
(from 52% to 46%) in the corporate tax rate. However, the most impor- 
tant factor has been the introduction of several investment incentives, cul- 
minating in the Accelerated Cost Recovery System instituted in 1981. For 
a number of reasons, the effects of these programs on the incentive to in- 
vest cannot be judged from trends in corporate tax revenues. 
First, these programs were generally not retroactive.  As a result, there 
could be relatively small change in actual tax payments in the years imme- 
diately following a new investment  incentive, particularly for corpora- 
tions with slower growth. However, even several years after such a pro- 
gram’s  enactment,  concurrent tax payments  offer little guidance about 
the corporation’s incentive to invest. This is because investment incentives 
such as the investment tax credit or the shortening of depreciation lives 
work by reducing income taxes in the years immediately following an in- 
vestment. In later years, the corporation will actually pay more taxes on 
the income from the investment, since depreciation allowances will have 
been exhausted. The net effect to the corporation is positive but is over- 
stated by the tax reduction in the earliest years. Hence, a fast-growing cor- 
poration with a very “young” capital stock might offset all its current tax 
liability, but this will not be true in the future. A stagnant corporation 
with a very “old” capital stock might have no tax credits or depreciation 
deductions at all, but this overstates the tax burden on investment by fail- 
ing to account for the tax benefits that were received in the years soon 
after the firm’s capital goods were purchased. 
In a sense, each investment faces a different tax rate on its income in 
each year, with this rate increasing as the asset ages. What matters for the 
investment decision is the present value of taxes paid over the asset’s entire 
life, not the taxes paid in a given year. 
This point may be illustrated by a numerical example. Imagine an asset 
purchased  for $1000, yielding 20% per year before depreciation and re- 111  Economic Effects of the Corporate Income Tax 
ceiving a 10% investment tax credit and a standard 5-year ACRS write- 
off. Suppose that the asset actually depreciates at 10% per year. That is, 
each year its income is 10% lower than in the previous year. Also suppose, 
for the sake of simplicity, that there is no inflation. Then the asset’s in- 
come and tax payments over time are as given in table 6.1. Shown in par- 
entheses below actual depreciation allowances are those that would corre- 
spond to the real or “economic”  depreciation of the asset, of  10%  per 
year. This figure is deducted from gross income to obtain a measure of ac- 
tual economic income, against which taxes are compared to obtain each 
year’s tax rate for the asset. 
Because of the investment incentives, this tax rate is negative for the 
first 5 years but very positive thereafter. It would be no more correct to  say 
that firms with 3-year-old assets have a tax rate of  -21% (never mind 
how they manage to obtain these refunds-I  return to this below) than 
that firms with 6-year-old assets face one of +  92%. The overall impact is 
somewhere in between. 
This impact can be measured by taking the present value of taxes paid 
and finding the constant tax rate on economic income that would yield the 
same value. Table 6.2  (taken from Auerbach 1983) gives these calculations 
for two types of assets, general industrial equipment and industrial struc- 
tures, and for all corporate fixed assets as a whole, for the years 1953-82. 
They are based under the assumptions that corporations used the most 
generous available tax treatment in each year, that they required a return 
of 4%  after tax, and that they projected inflation based on past inflation 
behavior. Aside from the general decline in tax rates, except for a few 
years during the 1970s, there has been a shift in the tax burden from equip- 
ment to structures. This would appear to present the incentive for corpora- 
tions to invest more in equipment, relative to structures, than is socially de- 
Table 6.1  Tnx Rates for a Hypothetical Asset 
Year 
1  2  3  4  5  6  I 
Gross  200  180  162  146  131  118  106 
income 
Depreciation  143  209  200  200  200  0  0 
allowance  (100)  (90)  (81)  (73)  (66)  (59)  (53) 
Investment  100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
credit 
Taxes  -74  -  13  -17  -25  -32  +  54  +  49 
E  c  o  n  o  m  i c  100  90  81  13  65  59  53 
income 
Tax  rate (%)  -74  -  14  -21  -  34  -  49  +  92  +  92 112  Alan J. Auerbach 
Table 6.2  Effective Tax Rates for Equipment and Structures, 1953-82 (70)  ’ 
General 
Industrial  Industrial 


























































































































sirable, but there is an important qualification to this conclusion that will be 
discussed below in the section dealing with corporate borrowing. 
The negative tax rate for equipment in 1981 means that the negative tax 
liabilities  of the early years (as illustrated  in table 6.1) outweighed the 
positive ones of  later years. Such investments led to a net tax refund for 
investing corporations. 
Aside from the distinction between these effective tax rates and those 
tax rates calculated by comparing current taxes to current income, there 
are other important implications of  the presence of  incentives in the tax 
structure. First is the increased possibility of negative tax liabilities, even 
for profitable firms. Because of the corporate tax treatment of losses, this 
may have a very unpredictable impact on the incentives for firms to in- 113  Economic Effects of the Comorate Income Tax 
vest. Second, because new assets have yet to receive their investment in- 
centives, they will be worth more to corporations than otherwise identical 
but older assets already in place. Refer again to table 6.1, and imagine a 
company with two pieces of equipment of comparable productive capac- 
ity.  One was just purchased,  while the other is  6 years old. The first is 
clearly more valuable, because it has the prospect of 5 years of refunds be- 
fore it must start paying taxes. All the older asset has in its future is years 
with no depreciation deductions at all. Not only does it receive no invest- 
ment incentives, but it must repay the deferred taxes associated with the 
forward shifting of depreciation allowances. 
What this means is that, per dollar of capital, existing assets will gener- 
ally be worth less than new assets. The estimated extent of this discount is 
shown in table 6.3 (taken from Auerbach 1983). The number shown is the 
lhble 6.3  Ratio of Market Value to Replacement Cost: 'Ibe Impact of Deferred 
lhxes 
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ratio of the total value of the aggregate corporate fixed capital stock, tak- 
ing accounts of these tax differentials, to the value these assets would have 
if all were equally productive but treated as new assets by the tax law. 
Based on the size of the corporate capital stock, I calculated this gap be- 
tween actual value and replacement cost to be $427 billion in 1982. This 
was the present value then of taxes due on old assets in excess of the taxes 
on comparable new assets. Combined with the capitalization effect asso- 
ciated with dividends, discussed in the previous section, this has the po- 
tential to  explain a large gap between the intrinsic value of assets owned by 
corporations and their stock market values. 
6.4  The Corporate Tax and Risk Taking 
There are several ways in which the corporate tax affects the decision to 
invest in risky assets. In each case, a corporation’s tax payments as a per- 
centage of income offer little guidance about the incentives actually faced. 
Perhaps the most important of these effects is associated with the cor- 
porate income tax’s asymmetric treatment  of a corporation’s gains and 
losses. Income is fully taxable, but losses do not lead to a refund at the 
corporate rate. Instead, taxpayers must either carry the losses back for an 
immediate refund or, if recent income is insufficient, carry the losses for- 
ward to await deduction against  future income or expiration.  Further, 
similar restrictions exist on the use of tax credits, such as the investment 
tax credit. 
This asymmetry means that a corporation with risky income will, in 
present value,  pay more taxes in the future than if the income had the 
same expected return but were always positive. Hence, risk taking is af- 
fected. But to know how it is affected, one must know the firm’s current 
tax status as well as the types of projects it is considering. Indeed, it is pos- 
sible that firms with taxable income, paying taxes, are at an advantage rel- 
ative to firms that are not. This is more likely given the recently increased 
acceleration of depreciation allowances discussed in the previous section. 
While the prospect of not being able to get a refund for potential losses 
may discourage the undertaking of risky projects, firms that already have 
incurred such losses may carry forward a tax shield to reduce taxes on fu- 
ture income, thereby lowering taxes in the future. If, on average, the firm 
expected its current investments to yield additional tax liability, this shield 
would provide an added incentive to invest. However, as shown by the ex- 
ample in table 6.1, many investments now will generate negative tax liabil- 
ities in their early years, even if they earn a normal rate of return. Hence, a 
tax shield carried forward may actually make such investments less attrac- 
tive by making the deduction of these additional losses impossible. This is 
offset by the fact that in subsequent years, when the assets generate posi- 
tive tax liabilities, these are more likely to be shielded from taxation. 115  Economic Effects of the Corporate Income Tax 
To measure the net impact of  these effects, I considered (Auerbach 
1983) how the expected present value of taxes associated with different as- 
sets would be affected by a firm’s initial tax status and the probability that 
this tax status would change from year to year. Using data from 1959 to 
1978 for several hundred major U.S. corporations, I estimated the prob- 
ability of  having a net tax loss carry-forward in any given year and the 
probability that this loss would be exhausted in the next and subsequent 
years. I then measured the taxes that representative firms, purchasing an 
asset with a riskless, 6% return annually after depreciation, would expect 
to pay in each year over the asset’s life. Each calculation proceeded in two 
steps. First, the annual accrued tax liability for each year, such as those 
shown in table 6.1, was calculated. Then, estimates were made of when, 
statistically, each of these liabilities would actually result in a tax payment. 
Since a firm might have a tax loss carry-forward (from other parts of its 
operations) in each year, there is some probability that each year’s tax 
payment would be deferred, more so for firms beginning with a large tax 
loss carry-forward in the year of the investment. 
To test the effect of  different conditions on the results, I performed 
these calculations for both industrial equipment and industrial structures; 
for zero,  medium,  and high rates of inflation; and under depreciation 
provisions that existed in 1965, 1972, and 1982. For each assumption of 
asset types, inflation rate, and tax law, the calculation was done for two 
representative corporations: one starting off with a substantial current tax 
liability and the potential  for a tax loss carry-back, and one beginning 
with a large tax loss carry-forward. These firms are labeled “high tax” and 
“low tax” for the results shown in table 6.4. The numbers in the table are 
Table 6.4  Eilective Tpx Rates: The Importance of Deferred Payment, by 
Tpxable  Status (70) 
General Industrial  Industrial 
Equipment  Structures 
Tax Law and 
Inflation Rate  Low Tax  High Tax  Low Tax  High Tax 
1%5  tax law: 
No  inflation 
4% 
8% 
No  inflation 
4% 
8% 
No  inflation 
4% 
8% 
1972 tax law: 
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“effective” tax rates, as described above, calculated as the tax rate on eco- 
nomic income that would leave firms with the same expected present value 
of taxes from the investment. 
The table offers a number of familiar results. For each type of investor 
and asset, the tax changes from 1972 to 1982 led to lower tax liabilities. 
For any given asset, investor, and year, an increase in the inflation rate led 
to higher tax payments because of the declining real value of depreciation 
allowances. As depicted above, recent tax changes have greatly increased 
the relative tax incentive to invest in equipment instead of structures. 
The main new result in the table is that firms in the “high tax” position 
were likely to pay less in taxes on their new investments than their “low 
tax” counterparts, because of the greater likelihood of obtaining the full 
value of the early years’ negative tax liabilities. This has become especially 
true for equipment since the most recent tax law changes. Hence, the ob- 
servation of one firm paying a larger fraction of its earnings in taxes than 
another is certainly a poor guide to the relative incentives for these firms 
to undertake new investment. 
An implication of these findings is that those firms with existing profit- 
able operations providing taxable income are better disposed to  undertake 
new investments, either directly or through the purchase of  other firms 
making these investments. Once again, the tax system provides an extra 
incentive for  the acquisition of one firm by another. 
6.5  Determinants of Corporate Leverage 
An element of  corporate policy that adds to  each of the preceding ones 
and helps tie them together is the debt-equity decision. While the advan- 
tages of retaining earnings instead of  issuing new shares are fairly clear, 
the decision of how much growth to finance internally and how much 
through the flotation of debt has many interesting and complex aspects. 
There are theories to explain how much corporations borrow, when they 
borrow, and the maturity structure of their borrowing, but these theories 
are often incomplete predictors of actual behavior. 
The tax law plays a central role in most models of  corporate leverage, 
and its recent changes motivate some of the current interest in the ques- 
tion of what determines corporate  borrowing. As shown above in sections 
6.3 and 6.4, estimates suggest that the effective tax rates on structures lie 
substantially above those on equipment. Further, nondepreciable assets, 
such as land and inventories, do not qualify for any investment incentives 
comparable to those available for plant and equipment. This suggests that 
there exists a potentially serious distortion in the choice of  corporate in- 
vestments, but such a conclusion is necessarily valid only if a separation 
prevails between real and financial corporate decisions.  If, in contrast, 
there are tax advantages to  borrowing, and leverage is more acceptable to 117  Economic Effects of the Corporate Income Tax 
corporations when investing in structures or land than in equipment, this 
might offset the tax disadvantage of the former assets to which we have al- 
ready alluded. 
In another paper (Auerbach  1985), I estimated models of the determi- 
nants of corporate borrowing. Before discussing the actual results, it will 
be useful to review briefly some of the theories that lie behind the model. 
Most theories of corporate leverage begin with the twin observations 
that corporate taxation appears to bias the choice of financial policy com- 
pletely toward debt and that corporations typically finance perhaps only 
one-quarter of their accumulations of capital by issuing debt. The chal- 
lenge is to explain why this is so. 
The most basic explanation  for observed debt-equity ratios is costly 
bankruptcy. However, empirical evidence tends to refute the notion that 
potential bankruptcy costs alone are of the same magnitude as the corpo- 
rate tax advantage to debt. Moreover, additional borrowing may lead to 
other costs, referred to in the finance literature as “agency” costs, associ- 
ated with the idea that it is difficult for holders of long-term bonds in a 
firm to  protect themselves from the firm’s taking subsequent action that is 
detrimental to  their interests, such as the commencement of an extremely 
risky new investment program. With limited corporate liability, this act 
imparts some of the program’s risk to holders of  debt. In anticipation of 
such behavior, lenders might  demand a high-risk  premium  from firms 
with a high probability of  engaging in such activity, such as firms with 
high debt-equity ratios. 
One would expect a firm’s potential agency costs to differ according to 
a number  of  characteristics  in addition to its debt-equity  ratio.  Myers 
(1977) suggests that the problem is more acute for “growth” firms whose 
value derives largely from anticipated future decisions, since they possess 
more flexibility in their actions. Presumably the same argument holds for 
firms whose capital stock has a short maturity, for these firms’ future re- 
placement investment decisions loom much larger. This could be a reason 
for firms that use structures relatively more than equipment in their pro- 
duction processes to borrow more, or at least borrow more long term. 
Additional  explanations  for the  limitation  on corporate borrowing 
come from suggestions that other tax factors act, cumulatively, to offset 
the tax advantage to borrowing, so that at a certain point the net tax ad- 
vantage to borrowing disappears. At the corporate level, the tax advan- 
tage to debt is lost if firms do  not have sufficient taxable income to  deduct 
their  interest  payments.  As firms borrow  more and attempt to deduct 
more interest, this eventuality becomes ever more likely. This is the es- 
sence of the argument offered by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). The hy- 
pothesis has a number of testable implications. First, firms with substan- 
tial loss carry-forwards  should choose to issue less debt. (Care must be 
taken since such firms may also be in greater need  of funds.) Second, 118  Alan J. Auerbach 
firms investing in assets with a greater fraction of their total after-tax re- 
turns generated by tax credits and deductions should also use less debt fi- 
nance, for they typically will have less taxable income for any given level 
of borrowing. Again, this is a reason why firms might borrow less to fi- 
nance purchases of equipment. Finally, one would expect that firms with 
riskier earnings streams would be less likely to borrow, for these firms 
would face a more likely prospect of having insufficient taxable income, 
in any given year, to deduct all interest payments. 
As with the pure bankruptcy explanation, this “limited tax shield’’ ar- 
gument, by itself, is unlikely to be important enough to explain the typical 
firm’s observed borrowing behavior. As part of  the study of tax losses 
(Auerbach 1983), I estimated the present value of tax deductions from an 
additional dollar of  debt for a typical firm and found that such a firm 
could expect to get about 92% of  the value of  these deductions. Equiv- 
alently, this would be as if firms could deduct interest payments regardless 
of their own tax status, but at a 42% rather 46% tax rate. This is still a 
substantial tax benefit. 
However, this differential is diminished by the consideration of personal 
taxes. Miller (1977) argued that the individual tax advantages to equity 
may offset those to debt at the firm level. The basic argument is that since, 
at the individual level, interest payments are taxable, while only dividends 
and not capital gains are taxed fully, the individual tax burden on the re- 
turn to equity is lower than that on debt. In its simplest form this explana- 
tion is implausible, since the corporate tax on all equity earnings plus the 
additional dividend taxation of that part of the individual return to equity 
that is distributed to shareholders is substantially higher than the individ- 
ual tax on interest  income,  regardless of  the individual’s tax bracket. 
However, this effect may lessen the initial tax advantage to leverage and, 
in conjunction with other reasons for limits on leverage given above, may 
help explain observed behavior. 
Moreover, as argued above in section 6.2, though individual stock- 
holders pay taxes on dividends, these taxes do not necessarily constitute a 
burden on the current return to equity. Because the value of the firm may 
be discounted to account for the presence of the dividend tax, the tax itself 
does not lower the return on investment for an equity holder. This point 
makes Miller’s original argument more realistic, for it means that the only 
additional taxation of equity earnings besides the corporate tax itself is 
the individual capital gains tax. 
In summary, explanations for borrowing limitations range over tax and 
nontax factors. Among the latter are the potential bankruptcy and agency 
costs that are thought to derive from additional leverage. Among the for- 
mer are the limited deductibility of additional interest payments by the 
corporate borrower and the offsetting tax advantages to equity at the indi- 
vidual level. 119  Economic Effects of the Corporate Income Tax 
To test these different theories, I gathered balance sheet and income 
statement data for the period  1958-77 on 143 firms for which sufficient 
information was available about capital stock composition. All of  the 
firms chosen listed annual investment and capital stocks separately for 
three categories: structures, land, and equipment. 
As in the calculations described in section 6.2, the first step was to cor- 
rect several book measures, such as earnings and debt. The former had to 
be corrected  for inventory  valuation  and capital consumption  adjust- 
ments, and the latter for deviations from market value associated with in- 
terest rate changes. 
Once this was done, I used the data from all of  the firms to estimate 
models of short-term and long-term borrowing. The models specify that 
there is, for each firm, a desired ratio of short-term debt to total value and 
long-term debt to total value. The annual borrowing decision is modeled 
as being one of partial adjustment, with the change in each ratio of debt to 
value depending on three factors: the gap between desired long-term debt 
and its current level, the gap between desired short-term debt and its cur- 
rent level, and the “cash flow” gap between current  investment funds 
needed and the amount of funds available through retentions after a nor- 
mal dividend distribution.  Hence, the amount of  long-term (or short- 
term) borrowing is hypothesized to be influenced by how much long-term 
debt the firm would like to add, how much short-term debt it would like to 
add, and how much debt overall it must add if it is not to reduce its divi- 
dend growth or issue new equity shares. 
The estimated equations indicate that firms close about 44% of the gap 
between desired and actual long-term debt-value ratios within a year but 
that short-term borrowing responds more rapidly, closing over 79% of the 
gap between desired and actual levels within a year. Both forms of bor- 
rowing respond positively to the size of the cash flow deficit, and short- 
term debt appears to increase also when there is a desire for more long- 
term debt, indicating a degree of substitutability between the two forms of 
borrowing. 
We turn next to the determinants of desired debt-value ratios. For both 
long-term and short-term debt, I estimated the impact of a number of 
firm characteristics. Included in this group are the tax loss carry-forward 
(if present), the earnings growth rate, the variance of earnings (adjusted 
for borrowing) around trend, and the fraction of the firm’s value accounted 
for by land, structures, equipment, net current assets (including inven- 
tories), and goodwill, respectively. The last fraction is simply defined as 
the residual difference between the aggregate replacement value of the firm’s 
assets in the other four categories and the market value of the firm itself. 
This is intended to measure future earnings prospects, among other things. 
There are many  factors estimated to affect significantly the desired 
debt-value ratios, but only some are consonant with the theories laid out 120  Alan J. Auerbach 
above. As expected, land appears to be the most heavily leveraged of all 
assets, and goodwill is less associated with borrowing than land, equip- 
ment, or current  assets.  However,  for both long-term  and short-term 
debt, the assets that are estimated to have the lowest associated debt-equity 
ratios are structures. This is a puzzle for which I have no ready explana- 
tion. Also puzzling is the positive impact on leverage of a firm’s growth 
rate, although  here it must be recalled that all of  the firms studied are 
large,  blue chip corporations. In this context,  “growth company” does 
not have the usual connotation of being a speculative enterprise. Finally, 
the effects of earnings variance and tax loss carry-forwards on leverage 
are not especially perceptible. 
Thus, the results offer no support for the proposition that companies 
investing primarily in structures borrow more than companies investing in 
equipment, though land does seem to have greater associated borrowing. 
The separation between  real and financial decisions does not appear to 
hold, but no combination of  the theories reviewed above is sufficient to 
explain this borrowing pattern completely. Hence, it is difficult to know 
how to  bring the tax advantage to debt into calculations of overall tax in- 
centives facing investments of different types, though it appears there is a 
substantial tax advantage to investing in equipment rather  than struc- 
tures. 
6.6  Conclusions 
I have discussed in each of the sections above how the impact of the cor- 
porate tax is difficult to measure from observed revenue figures alone. It 
will be useful to  summarize them here. 
First, the existence of  “double taxation” of dividends is highly ques- 
tionable. The payment of dividend taxes does not mean that these taxes 
affect the returns to  current investors, because the taxes will already be re- 
flected in the firm’s market value via a discount relative to the intrinsic 
value of  the firm’s assets.  Second, investment incentives defer tax pay- 
ments  by corporations, so that income from newer assets  is taxed  less 
heavily than that from older assets. This makes aggregate corporate tax 
payments meaningless as economic indicators. Because of  the relatively 
bigger tax shield offered by new investments, older assets will carry a dis- 
count in the determination of a corporation’s market value, leading to a 
second tax-associated cause for the presence of a discount in the value of 
corporate equity. 
The riskiness of corporate investments combined with the asymmetry 
of the corporate tax in its treatment of gains and losses means that the cor- 
poration’s incentive to invest depends on  its tax status. Given the negative 
accrued tax liabilities in the early years after an investment is made, asso- 
ciated with investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation, the incen- 121  Economic Effects of the Corporate Income Tax 
tive to invest is greater for a firm that is currently taxable than for a firm 
that is not. 
Finally, the financial decision, if not made separately from the real in- 
vestment decision, may influence  the investment choice among various as- 
sets. Observed behavior indicates that financial and real decisions are re- 
lated, but not strictly according to any pattern predicted by  prevailing 
theories. 
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